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RECENT DECISIONS
FEDERAL INCOME TAX - VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS
TO WIDOWS OF CORPORATE OFFICERS -
GIFT OR COMPENSATION
Martin v. Commissioner (3d Cir. 1962)
Petitioner, the widow of a former corporation president, re-
ceived voluntary payments from the corporation of $32,727.24
in 1955 and $27,272.76 in 1956, pursuant to a board of direc-
tor's resolution. Petitioner failed to report these payments as
income, causing the Commissioner to assess a deficiency
against her claiming that they were taxable as ordinary in-
come. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, concluding
that petitioner failed to establish that the payments con-
stituted a gift. Petitioner appealed, contending that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Duberstein1 did
not establish a new standard for determining whether pay-
ments by a corporation to a widow constitute a gift, and that
on the basis of pre-Duberstein Tax Court holdings, the instant
payments clearly constituted a gift. HELD: Decision of the
Tax Court affirmed. Payments made by corporation to widow
of deceased president of corporation for two years after his
death were made as additional compensation for services ren-
dered by deceased president, and as such were taxable income
and not gifts. Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d
Cir. 1962).
Since the Revenue Act of 1913, gifts have been excluded
from taxable income. Section 102 (a) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code continues this policy and provides that "the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or in-
heritance" shall be exempted from gross income. However,
where there is no specific statutory exemption, receipts orig-
inating from an employment relationship are taxable under
section 61 (a) (1) as "income from whatever source derived
including compensation for services." For a generation
Bogardus v. Helvering,2 the leading case in this field, held
that in the absence of the constraining force of any moral or
legal duty or the incentive of anticipated benefit of an eco-
nomic nature, the payment was not compensation. Such a
payment was a gift and the two terms were held to be
1. 363 U.S. 278, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960).
2. 302 U.S. 34, 82 L.Ed. 32 (1937).
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mutually exclusive, because under the statute a payment could
not be both a gift and compensation. Mr. Justice Brandeis
in his dissent doubted this distinction because a payment,
though made without consideration and hence in form a com-
mon law gift, when received as compensation for services was
taxable income. His suggested standard was the objective
intention concluded by the trier of fact from the competing
aims or motives of the donor. The dissent gained acceptance
where the Tax Court found that a payment was additional
compensation for services rendered; if supported by evidence,
such a finding was controlling.3 Generally, any economic or
financial benefit conferred on an employee was strictly con-
strued as compensation. 4 However, cases involving voluntary
payments to retired clergymen were distinguished as non-
taxable gifts.5 Similarly, corporate payments to deceased of-
ficers' widows were upheld as gifts." The 1954 Internal Rev-
enue Code introduced section 101 (b) (2), excluding from
gross taxable income up to $5,000.00 of employee death bene-
fits paid the beneficiary or estate. The Commissioner in-
terpreted the congressional purpose to include as gross in-
come all employee death benefits in excess of $5,000.00. In
dicta in two cases,7 this negative implication was approved.
After a later case s which held that employer payments to
the widow of employee were non-taxable under section 101
(b) (2) of the 1954 Code, the Commissioner announced a
refusal to follow the decision, considering it a misinterpreta-
tion of the code. 9 He became a consistent loser so that after
the treasury interpretation was struck down again,10 it was
abandoned. 1 Quest for a new standard in this area was un-
successful as the Supreme Court refused to produce "a talis-
man for the solution of concrete cases."'12 Instead, Mr. Justice
Brennan, writing an opinion with the concurring majority of
the Court, overruled Bogardus v. Helvering,'3 and accepted the
3. Nickelsburg v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1946).
4. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 100 L.Ed. 1142 (1956).
5. Mutch v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1954).
6. United States v. Bankston, 254 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1958).
7. Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958); Rodner v.
United States, 149 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
8. Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd, 277
F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
9. TECHNICAL INFORMATION RELEAsE 252 (Sept. 13, 1960).
10. Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
11. TECHNICAL INFORMATION REI.-Asn 371 (March 19, 1962).
12. Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 1.
13. 302 U.S. 34,82 L.Ed 32 (1937).
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Brandeis dissent. Whether a payment constitutes a gift is
a factual issue that rests with the trier of fact. The determi-
nation of the trier of fact based on consideration of all the
factors must be given primary weight and must be affirmed
unless clearly erroneous. 14 Subsequently, this doctrine pro-
nouncing the trial court's finding as essentially a question
of fact was reaffirmed.15
In the instant case the appellate court held that the trial
court was not clearly erroneous and hence its decision must be
affirmed. However, the premise underlying the decision is the
unsatisfactory Duberstei doctrine. Whether a voluntary pay-
ment constitutes a gift continues to be controlled by the ob-
jective intention of the donor. The standard established by
the Duberstein decision requires the fact finder to apply his
informed experience to all the facts and determine the basic,
dominant reason for the payment.16 Thus, the individual
finder of fact must translate his experience into legal stand-
ards in each given case. Translations of trial courts or juries
will be widely varied and appellate courts may disagree with
these divergencies. Without an ultimate standard the whole
question of what constitutes a gift seems wide open: This is
an unpleasant situation to both government and private at-
torneys who cannot advise the resolution of problems that
subsequently develop into litigation. Presently the Commis-
sion's position, rejected by the Supreme Court's intention test,
is that the motive of the donor should be the standard.' 7 The
issue should be the reason why a payment was made, with a
resulting distinction between a payment for personal reasons
and one for business reasons. This suggestion defines a gift
as a payment motivated by personal reasons. In disregard
of scholarly criticismP8 the Supreme Court has refused to
modify the Duberstein doctrine. On November 13, 1962, re-
view of the instant case and four others involving corporate
payments to widows of deceased officers was denied. Instead,
the Supreme Court has suggested in the Duberstein decision
that Congress might "make more precise its treatment of the
14. Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 1.
15. Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 8 L.Ed.2d 484 (1962).
16. Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 1.
17. Rothschild, Business Gifts as Income, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED.
TAX 147,155 (1961).
18. Griswold, The Supreme Court - 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REV. 81,
88-92 (1960); Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, TME
Sup. CT. Rsv. 222, 234-237 (Kurland ed. 1960).
[Vol. 15
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matter" by singling out certain factors and making them
,determinative. A new, explicit statute would have to select
-criteria to be accorded greater weight. The factor that would
seem most deserving of moving a receipt towards income
would be that the payment was made primarily because of the
employment relationship. Such a rule would allow gifts in
small amounts because of the specific statutory exception in
section 101 (b) (2). Presently, the finding in every case is
an educated guess based on the fact finder's informed
experience. The objective intention of the donor is a question
of fact that individual trial courts may interpret differently
although based on the same criteria. Moreover, unless there
is a clear-cut mistake of law, the appellate court must affirm
the finding. Thus, the Duberstein doctrine is impossible of
application with any certainty, nor can any consistent pattern
evolve. A similar situation arose in Dobson v. Commission,10
which held that the Tax Court decision was entitled to ad-
ministrative finality of factual matters and not subject to
review unless clearly erroneous. An impasse developed in
Kelley v. Commissioner,20 involving two cases with essentially
similar facts that the Tax Court had decided differently. Yet
the Supreme Court held that Dobson applied and affirmed
both inconsistent decisions. In 1948, Congress passed a re-
vision to the Judicial Code that killed the Dobson rule.
2 '
Similarly, in the instant case, the Duberstein doctrine should
be overturned, either by court or legislative pronouncement
of a more delimiting standard.
WALTON J. MoLEOD
19. 320 U.S. 489, 88 L.Ed. 248 (1943).
20. 326 U.S. 521, 90 L.Ed. 278 (1946).
21. Now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7482(a).
1963]
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INSURANCE - MANUFACTURERS' AND
CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY - APPLICATION OF
"CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL" IN
EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE
Gibson v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. (S.C. 1962)
The plaintiff was a contractor insured by a manufacturers'
and contractors' liability insurance policy issued by the de-
fendant. The policy provided protection from claims arising
from accidental injury to property resulting from the business
operations of the plaintiff, and contained an exclusionary
clause which denied protection from claims for injury to
"property in the care, custody or control of the insured or
property as to which the insured for any purpose is exercising
physical control."
The plaintiff was employed to clean the inside walls and
bottom of a swimming pool, and in the course of performance
the pool was partially drained. The plaintiff left the pool in
this condition at the end of the day, and returned the next
morning to find that the pool had been forced out of its
foundation by hydrostatic pressure.
The sole question presented to the trial judge was whether
the pool was in the "care, custody or control" of the plaintiff,
and thus excluded from coverage by the exclusionary clause
in the policy. The trial court directed a verdict for the de-
fendant, and the plaintiff appealed. HELD: reversed. The
application of such a policy provision is dependent largely
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but in every
case the exclusionary clause refers to injury when the prop-
erty is in the "care, custody or control" of the insured. Since
the pool was not, at the time of the accident, in the care,
custody or control of the insured, the exclusion does not apply.
Gibson v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 293, 128 S.E.2d 157
(1962).
At first glance, the particular exclusionary clause in this
case appears to be a rigid, if not contradictory, limitation upon
insurance,1 since the business operations of an insured would
1. "Construing such conglomerate provisions requires a skill not unlike
that called for in the decipherment of obscure palimsest texts." Elcar, Inc.
v. Baxter, Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 478, 481, 169 A.2d 509, 510 (1960), quoting
from, Calmar S. S. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 427, 432, 97 L.Ed. 1125, 1132 (1953).
722
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ordinarily be concerned with and inclusive of property in his
"care, custody or control." Although the clause has generated
confusion, courts have generally relied upon two maxims to
aid in discriminating between property in the specific custody
"care, custody or control" - of an insured, and property
which is merely within the scope of his customary business
operation: that "the application of such a policy provision is
dependent largely upon the facts and circumstances of each
case," 2 and that "the primary object of all insurance is to
insure" 3
It is interesting that the clause itself has been the subject
of an equally divided controversy. Some authorities consider
the clause to be "inherently ambiguous" and to contain "words
of art" which must be "strictly construed against the in-
surer.' 4 Conversely, other authorities have had no admitted
difficulty with the clause, finding that "the language of the
policy is clear," and thus there is no necessity to construe the
policy beyond its own import.5 Unfortunately, a judgment
of the clause's clarity does not appear to lead to a more logical
or predictable result than finding it to be ambiguous,6 for
the extremes of property7 which become subject to the
enigmatic question of possession resist more than a guess as
to what result will be reached by courts of either opinion.
"Care, custody or control" indicates a possessory interest
less than ownership, and extends to eliminate coverage in
"situations in which the insured is closely connected with
the property by exercising some sort of control over it,"1 as
2. Gibson v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 293, 128 S.E.2d 157 (1962).
3. 13 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE 37 (1st ed. 1943).
4. Boswell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 599, 120 A.2d 250
(1950); see also Innis v. McDonald, 77 Ohio L.Abs. 417, 150 N.E.2d 441
(C.P. 1956).
5. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Holmsgaard, 10 Il.App.2d 1, 133 N.E.2d 910,
914 (1956); see also Hill v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 48 Tenn.
App. 407, 348 S.W.2d 512 (1961).
6. Whether the clause is thought to be contradictory or not has little
apparent effect on the result of a given case. Compare cases in foot-
notes 4 and 5.
7. Such as an airplane, Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Saltzman, 213 F.2d
743 (8th Cir. 1954) ; an elevator, Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mason-Moore-
Tracy, Inc., 194 F.2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1952); a bulldozer, P. & M. Stone
Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., - Iowa -, 100 N.W.2d 28 (1959);
a statue of Robert E. Lee, Hooley v. Zurich Gen. Ace. Ins. Co., 235 La.
289, 103 So.2d 449 (1958); realty, Cohen v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 151
Pa. Super. 211, 30 A.2d 203 (1943); A. T. Morris Co. v. Lumber Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 163 Misc. 715, 298 N.Y.S. 227 (Mun. Ct. 1941).
8. Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1237, 1243 (1958).
6
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well as to property owned by the insured. In this particular
area, the phrase imports an interest less than possession or
bailment, although this view is not uniform, nor have these
technical definitions been strictly applied. 9 Elementally, pos-
session is "that power over the thing which the thing itself
permits," "the manifested intent to control," and the "power
to exclude all others from a like control."' 01 But where the
owner does not intend "to relinquish the right, as distinguished
from the power of dominion" in transferring control to an-
other, "there is no bailment or possession, but only a mere
custody.""
The determination of custody by meeting these technical
requirements would not prove practical in every case, not
only because custody alone does not meet the requirements of
the clause, but also because something more than custody is
intended in the policy. Thus the emergent quest has been
for a concept rather than a simple definition of a term, and
the rules of application developed have been general, as
exemplified by this often cited test:
Where the property damaged is merely incidental to the
property upon which the work is being performed by the
insured, the exclusion is not applicable. However, where
the property damaged is under the supervision of the
insured, and is a necessary element of the work involved,
the property is in the "care, custody or control" of the
insured.12
The most specific test which has been applied looks to the
employment contract itself. In these cases, if the insured
has agreed to perform work on a specific piece of property,
or on a specific part of a piece of property, then he has "care,
custody or control" only of that, within the terms of the con-
tract of employment.' 3 For a general statement, the inquiry
has been said to depend upon "not only whether the property
is realty or personalty, but as well upon many other facts,
9. No case has been found which applied the traditional tests of pos-
session or custody where the "care, custody or control" clause was in-
volved.
10. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 19-22 (2d ed. 1936).
11. Id. at 269.
12. International Derrick & Equip. Co. v. Buxbaum, 240 F.2d 536, 538,
62 A.L.R.2d 1237 (3rd Cir. 1957); Condenser Serv. & Engr. Co. v. Ameri-
can Mut. Cas. Co., 58 N.J. Super. 179, 155 A.2d 789 (1959).
13. Cohen v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., supra note 7; A. T. Morris v.
Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., supra note 7.
[Vol. 15724
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such as location, size, shape and many other characteristics
of the property, what the insured is doing to it and how, and
the interest in and relation of the insured and others to it.'
14
In a given situation, "care, custody or control" is not readily
determined from the rules of application outlined. Perhaps
the best measure can be gleaned from a review of prior de-
cisions in which various, specific situations have been
analyzed.
Unfortunately, the South Carolina Supreme Court found
"a review and analysis of the various interpretations placed
upon such care, custody and control exclusions... unneces-
sary" 15 in the Gibson case, which presents the question for
the first time in South Carolina. Apparently, the Court's de-
cision was based upon the fact that the insured was not
present "at the time of the accident,"'16 a fact which removed
the pool from his "care, custody or control" even though he
had created the hazardous condition which resulted in the
injury. Aside from the interesting semantic readjustment
utilized by the Court to apply the rule in Crook v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co.,1 emphasizing time, the holding burdens the
insurer with the necessity of entering the premises of em-
ployment each time the insured departs to assure that there
are no unsafe conditions remaining to cause injury in his
absence. That "the rights of the parties are fixed at the
time of the loss"' 8 is a patent rule of insurance law, but it
has little application in a question of real property possession.
"Care, custody or control," once established, would endure
until some re-exchange or other final act, and would not
necessarily be terminated by leaving the premises. The Court
stated that "care, custody or control of property implies
more than a mere right of access to it' and this appears to
be the controlling point of the case. If the insured had a mere
right of access to the pool for the purpose of cleaning the
walls, he did not have "care, custody or control" of the pool
14. Elcar, Inc. v. Baxter, Inc., supra note 1.
15. Gibson v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., supra note 2.
16. Id., quoting from Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 175 S.C. 42, 178
S.E. 254 (1935).
17. 175 S.C. 42, 178 S.E. 254 (1935).
18. As applied in the Crook case, time was in reference to the rights
of two parties claiming the proceeds from insurance on a house which
had burned. The court held that "the rights of the parties must be fixed
at the time of the fire, and not one year later." Crook v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., supra note 17.
1963]
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss3/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REvIEw
itself, and the fact that he was not present at the time of the
accident would not bear on these facts.19
Although correct in result, the Gibson case does little to
supply the greatest need in this area - clarification. As a
practical matter, purchasers of this type of insurance cannot
be expected to understand the subtle distinctions which are
drawn after a claim is submitted,20 nor are insurance com-
panies expected to satisfy all claims because of the uncertainty
as to which claims will be enforced. Definitive exemplifica-
tion by the courts along with a cogent rule of application
would be a welcome relief to insurance companies, policy
holders and their attorneys alike. In any case, if the Gibson
decision may be taken as an indication of the future, the
clause will be strictly construed by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court to foster the primary function of the contract,
to provide insurance.
D. REECE WILLIAMS, III
19. Removing paint from outside of house, house not in "care, custody
or control of contractor, Innis v. McDonald, supra note 4; painting out-
side trim of house, no "care, custody or control" of injured windows or
siding, Meiser v. Aetna Cas. Co., 8 Wis.2d 233, 98 N.W.2d 919 (1959);
removing paint from housetrailer, no "care, custody or control" of dam-
aged panels of trailer, Elcar, Inc. v. Baxter, Inc., supra note 1.
20. Elcar, Inc. v. Baxter, Inc., supra note 1.
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